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City’s Watershed Regulations: Localities, Landowners Object to Changes
in Jurisdiction
Written for Publication in the New York Law Journal
Oct. 15, 1997
John R. Nolon and Heather M. Andrade
By John R. Nolon [Charles A. Frueauff Research Professor at Pace University
School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the considerable research
and editing contributions of Heather M. Andrade, research associate of the Land
Use Law Center at Pace University School of Law.]
Abstract: The Watershed Rules and Regulations, created by New York City’s
Department of Environmental Protection, influence several facets of law,
including the ability of local governments to regulate actions such as
construction. Several landowners in the affected area have taken issue with the
regulation.
Specifically, they challenge the constitutionality of the city’s
extraterritorial control on outside municipalities because of the resulting
diminutive effect of the regulations on private property values. This article
discusses these issues, as well as the legal ability for potential plaintiffs to sue.
***
I. Introduction
New York City’s Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) has
authority to regulate land use over a region that encompasses 2000 square
miles, 1.2 million acres, nine counties and seventy local governments. In a state
with a strong tradition of conferring home rule authority on its cities, towns and
villages, this is a curious exception.
On May 1, 1997, the Watershed Rules and Regulations became effective. In
addition to regulating the discharge, handling and storage of a variety of
chemicals, wastes and hazardous substances, the regulations directly affect the
development of land and the jurisdiction of local governments to regulate land
uses. These regulations have encountered serious resistance among affected
landowners and have caught the attention of local officials whose cooperation in
their enforcement is anticipated under a memorandum of agreement signed on
January 21, 1997.
In Loft Corporation v. City of New York (New York Law Journal, July 1, 1997
at 36 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 1997)), over fifty landowners in Putnam County brought nine
separate actions against the City. They allege that the City’s enforcement of the

watershed regulations causes injury that requires compensation under Public
Health Law § 1105 and violates the just compensation clause of the state
constitution. A number of issues regarding these regulations, their enforceability
and the liability of the City for the diminution of property values have been raised
since the regulations were issued, many of which are discussed by Judge
Hickman in the Loft Corporation case.
II. How Do the Regulations Impact Private Land Development and Local Home
Rule Authority?
First, they prevent most construction activity within 100 feet of a watercourse
or 300-500 feet of a reservoir, reservoir stem or controlled lake (§§18-36-18-39).
Of particular note are restrictions on the construction in these buffer zones of
subsurface discharge sewage treatment systems and of most impervious
surfaces such as roads, driveways, sidewalks and roofs. Second, in designated
60 day travel zones and phosphorus restricted basins, the construction of new
surface discharge wastewater treatment plants is prohibited (§36(b) & (d)). Such
plants are deemed necessary to serve the needs of larger scale development
projects. DEP may approve the construction of such plants over time, if the local
governments complete a number of planning studies (§ 18-82(b)(3)). Since these
studies will take years to complete, the development potential of significant areas
will not be known to landowners for some time.
In Putnam County, the DEP anticipates the participation of local governments
in the “Croton Plan.”
This, in turn, may require amendments to local
comprehensive plans and land use regulations. Substantial portions of four of the
six towns in Putnam County are located in phosphorus restricted and 60 day
travel time basins. Where surface wastewater plants are allowed to be
constructed will have great influence over where significant development projects
will be located; normally this is a function of local policy and regulation.
III. Is the City’s Use of it’s Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Constitutional?
In Loft, Judge Hickman writes that the extraterritorial jurisdiction of New York
City “may well pose a serious constitutional issue. Is it a proper exercise of
extraterritorial power to induce municipalities to change their master plans?” The
same question was raised in 1977 by landowners who attacked legislation
empowering the Adirondack Park Agency (APA) to regulate land uses in an area
encompassing 12 counties, 92 towns and 15 villages. The Court of Appeals
upheld the legislation noting that the “future of a cherished regional park is a
matter of State concern.” The court held that the Act’s impairment of home rule is
justified when “the motive is to serve a supervening State concern transcending
local interests.” Wambat Realty Corp. v. New York (41 N.Y.2d 490, 362 N.E.2d
581, 393 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1977))

The Public Health Law grants concurrent jurisdiction to the State Department
of Health and the DEP, whose regulations and enforcement activities are subject
to the approval of the State Commissioner of Health. In this legal regime, the
DEP is operating like the Adirondack Park Agency, as a state delegate, charged
with promoting a matter of state concern. The APA has authority to adopt land
use plans and policies to which affected localities must conform. It is empowered
to review and approve or disapprove local land use plans (N.Y. Exec. Law §§
805 & 807). The Court of Appeals had no trouble sustaining its constitutionality.
The mystery of the City’s jurisdiction is lessened by seeing it as analogous to
the authority of the Adirondack Park Agency. The legislative scheme that
empowers the City to regulate extraterritorially serves the broad state interest of
protecting the quality of drinking water.
IV. Are the Plaintiff’s Property Claims Ripe for Adjudication?
Judge Hickman wrote in Loft that the ongoing enforcement by DEP of
previous watershed regulations and “obvious intention to actively enforce the
new regulations are a sufficient basis to reject the City’s argument that the
owners…must apply for and await rejection of a specific project before their
claims are ripe.” To the City’s claim that the general rule of ripeness requires
landowners to exhaust administrative remedies, such as applications for
development permits and variances, Judge Hickman responds that there are
exceptions to the ripeness rule, among which are “where such pursuits would be
futile, or would cause irreparable injury.”
A principal case cited in Loft for the proposition that the plaintiff’s claims are
ripe is Rockland Light & Power Co. v. City of New York (289 N.Y. 45, 45 N.E. 2d
803 (1942). Rockland involved the City’s plans to construct a dam that would
deplete the flow of water passing potential water power sites owned by the
plaintiffs and decrease the value of its land and business. This case is analogous
in an important sense to the Loft case. In both, the facts indicate that it could be
years before the full impact on the plaintiffs’ land values could be fairly assessed.
There, the analogy between the cases stops. There were no administrative
remedies in the Rockland case available to the plaintiff. In Loft, the plaintiffs can
apply for development permits and variances from the strict application of the
regulations to prevent hardships (§ 18-23 & § 18.61). Because of the availability
of these remedies, the ripeness doctrine applicable in Loft would normally be
derived from the regulatory context rather than the public works context.
In a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court this summer, the prudential
reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction in regulatory takings cases were
reviewed. In Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (117 S.Ct. 1659), the
plaintiff based her claim on federal constitutional provisions similar to the state
provisions relied on by the plaintiffs in Loft. The court noted that the plaintiff must
demonstrate that she has received a “final decision regarding the application of

the [challenged] regulation to the property at issue….” The underlying idea, in
the context of a challenge to land use regulations, is that “a court cannot
determine whether a regulation has gone too far unless it knows how far the
regulation goes.” In Loft a great deal is not known about how far the watershed
regulations go. Whether, in this context, the plaintiffs’ claims are ripe is the major
issue to be addressed on appeal.
V. What Injury to Property Rights is Protected?
Judge Hickman’s opinion on the ripeness issue was influenced by § 1105 of
the Public Health Law which, in his view, provides a broad statutory cause of
action to all persons whose “rights of property” are injuriously affected by DEP’s
enforcement of the watershed regulations. The plaintiffs’ complaints allege a
variety of injuries to their property rights. These range from the taking of all
economically beneficial use of their land to constraints on the marketability of
land caused by the extensive time it will take to determine development potential
under the regulations.
The general rule requiring compensation for injury to property rights in New
York was set forth in St. Aubin v. Flacke (68 N.Y.2d 66, 496 N.E.2d 879, 505
N.Y.S.2d 859 (1986)). The Court of Appeals required that property owners must
prove that “all but a bare residue of the economic value of the parcels must have
been destroyed by the regulation at issue.” The court further noted that “a
property owner does not prove a taking solely by evidence that the value has
been reduced by the regulation, even if it has been substantially reduced.” To
date, this has been the rule applied to proving injury to property rights unless the
allegation is that the regulation serves as a guise for the condemnation of
property for a public use, or that a fundamental right, such as the right to exclude
others from one’s property, has been taken.
Unfortunately, § 1105 does not define what it means by its use of the term
“rights of property.” The 1873 version of § 72 of the Public Health Law, from
which § 1105 is descended, provided a cause of action to all persons affected by
regulations which required the removal of any building. This century-old statute
gave a cause of action to “all persons whose rights of property are injuriously
affected by the enforcement of any such rule or regulation.” This statutory
language was crafted nearly a half century before the U.S. Supreme Court first
held that a police power regulation can, if it goes too far, constitute a taking of
property rights. The legislature, acting in 1873 was more likely protecting the
owner’s vested right in an existing building.
In 1953, this statutory cause of action was broadened to apply to the City of
New York in recognition of its concurrent jurisdiction with the state board of
health. At that time, new language was added that extended the cause of action
to “all injuries caused to the legitimate use or operation of such property ….” This
language seems still to refer to damages caused by the removal of a building

occasioned or required by the offending regulation. Judge Hickman reads this
language differently, seeing it as a transaction through which jurisdiction was
given to DEP “specifically conditioned upon payment for any resulting injury to
owners.” He uses the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “injury” (“any damage
done to another”) as sufficient to demonstrate what the legislature intended.
“The Court thus construes PHL § 1105 to mean exactly what it states, namely,
that all plaintiffs need show is a present ‘injury’ arising from the acts of the City.”
Given this definition of the statute’s intent, to grant the City’s motion to dismiss
would be in error since there is some evidence of “current injury” and depressed
values in the real estate market. This would be sufficient to prove that the
plaintiffs have been presently injured to some extent and that the case is ripe for
adjudication. As noted, this is the principal issue to be decided on appeal.
VI. Conclusion
The stakes here are enormous, pitting the billions that the city and its rate
payers will incur in constructing filtration plants against the billions that will
allegedly be lost by private property owners whose lands are affected by the
watershed regulations.
The mechanics of governance in the state are
challenged: the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the City is attacked as are the
cooperative arrangements it has made with affected local governments whose
home rule authority, in turn, is diminished by the regulations. The role of the
courts and their prudential rules for avoiding controversies usually handled by
administrative agencies established to determine rights and values prior to
litigation is at issue as well. This is a drama well worth watching, and whose
unfolding will greatly impact the future development of land, intergovernmental
relations and land use litigation in the state.

